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PUBLIC FIGURE DEFAMATION: PRESERVING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PROTECT FREE EXPRESSION
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court, in Hutchinson v. Proxmire,1 recently an-
nounced its disapproval of the widespread use of summary judgment
in public figure defamation suits 2 in response to lower court asser-
tions that the summary procedure "may well be the 'rule' rather than
the 'exception' " in such actions. 3 In footnote nine, the Court stated
that
we are constrained to express some doubt about the so-called
"rule." The proof of "actual malice" calls a defendant's state of
mind into question, and does not readily lend itself to summary
disposition. In the present posture of the case, however, the pro-
priety of dealing with such complex issues by summary judgment is
not before us. 4
Although the fate of summary judgment in public figure defamation
cases was expressly left unresolved, the pronouncement has signifi-
1. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
2. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979). Defamation is the
non-privileged publication, either written or verbal, of a false statement to a third
party which injures the reputation of the plaintiff. 1 A. Hanson, Libel and Related
Torts § 14 (1969). Defamation is the invasion of a person's interest in his reputation
and good name. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of'Torts § 111 (4th ed, 1971).
3. Oliver v. Village Voice, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 235, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); accord,
Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 5 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1174, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 619 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied.
49 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 79-1987); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F.
Supp. 1311, 1330 (W.D. Wis. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443
U.S. 111 (1979); Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 449 (S.D.
Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978); Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
396 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd mein., 538 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1976);
see Comment, The Expanding Constitutional Protection for the News Media from
Liability for Defamation: Predictability and the New Synthesis, 70 Mich. L. Rev.
1547, 1565 & n. 116 (1972). Summary judgment was originally available only to plain-
tiffs, McLauchlan, An Empirical Study of the Federal Summary Judgment Rule, 6 J.
Legal Stud. 427, 441 (1977), but modern law allows either party to move for it. E.g.,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(b). Th'is Note is limited to a discussion of summary judgment
for defendants in public figure defamation actions.
4. 443 U.S. at 120 n.9 (citations omitted). The Court reversed a grant of sum-
mary judgment for defendant on the ground that the plaintiff was not a public figure
and thus, did not have to show actual malice, id. at 136, the standard required of
public figures. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); see notes
27-28 infra and accompanying text. In Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S.
157 (1979), decided the same day as Hutchinson, the Court reversed a grant of sum-
mary judgment in a public figure defamation case on identical grounds, id. at 169,
and cited the Hutchinson footnote. Id. at 161 n.3.
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cantly confused many lower courts 5 and, in some instances, has caused
denial of summary judgment where granting it was warranted. 6
This Note challenges the Supreme Court's observation that sum-
mary judgment may be inappropriate in most public figure defama-
tion actions and further contends that its use in this area is especially
appropriate in promoting free expression.
I. THE CONTEXT OF FOOTNOTE NINE
Standing alone, footnote nine could be interpreted as an innocuous
statement, intended only to advise lower courts to carefully scrutinize
summary judgment motions in public figure defamation cases. The
footnote, however, is the latest step in a trend whereby the Supreme
Court has continuously narrowed the protection its earlier decisions
afforded public figure defamation defendants. 7  Only in light of this
trend may the true significance, and potential impact, of footnote
nine be fully understood.8
5. See Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of the United States. Inc., 619 F.2d
932 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Oct. 7. 1980) (No. 79-197).
Hart v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc.. 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1811 (D. Kai. 1979).
Church of Scientology v. Siegelman, 475 F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Nader v. de
Toledano, 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980). Other courts
have taken cognizance of the footnote and attempted to reconcile their decisions ith
it. National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Whelan, 492 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Loeb v. New Times Communications Corp., 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1438 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Mount v. Sadik, No. 78 Civ. 2279 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1980). Rinslev v. Brandt,
6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1222 (D. Kan. 1980); Berkev v. Delia, 287 Md. 302. 413
A.2d 170 (1980); National Ass'n of Governmental Employees v. Central Broadcasting
Corp., 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2485, 396 N.E.2d 996 (1979). cert. denied. 100 S. Ct. 2152
(1980). See also Hall v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1333 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1980). A few courts have noted the Supreme Court dicta but have not
relied on it. Steaks Unltd., Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980). Cianci v.
New Times Publishing Co., 486 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). ret'd on other
grounds, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1625 (2d Cir. 1980).
6. Hart v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1811 (D. Kai.
1979); Church of Scientology v. Siegelman, 475 F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
7. Compare Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality
opinion) and Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971) and Greenbelt Coop. Publish-
ing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) and St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727
(1968) and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) and Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) with Hutch-
inson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) and Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443
U.S. 157 (1979) and Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) and Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
8. See Hentoff, Nader v. de Toledano, The Anatomy of a Malignant Libel Suit.
Village Voice, Apr. 7, 1980, at 20, col. I; Tybor, The Libel War Escalates. Nat'l L.J.,
Apr. 21, 1980, at 1, col. 1. A noted first amendment lawyer has suggested that foot-
note nine may preclude summary judgment in the future. [1980] Media L. Rep.
(BNA) News Notes (June 17, 1980) (on file with the Fordhamn Lau- Reviewc) [hereinaf-
ter cited as News Notes] ("The footnote 'may be rhetoric, but I doubt it'.... (quot-
ing Floyd Abrams, Esq.)).
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Until the landmark Supreme Court decision, New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,9 no special protection was afforded those who mistakenly
defamed persons of'public prominence. 10 The Sullivan Court, how-
ever, recognized that a primary purpose of the first amendment "
was to encourage self-government by permitting comment and criti-
cism of those charged with its leadership. 12 To ensure "freedom of
expression upon public questions"13 and to enhance the "profound
national commitment to . . . uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" de-
bate on public issues,' 4 the Sullivan Court held that public official
plaintiffs must pro-ve with "convincing clarity"' 15 that the defendant
9. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. Prior to Sullivan, defamation was not considered an issue of constitutional
dimension. Before 1964, "the consistent view of the Court was that libelous words
constitute a class of speech wholly unprotected by the First Amendment." Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974) (White, J., dissenting); see Beauharnals
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 292 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting); L. Eldredge, The Law
of Defamation § 50 (1978). The body of law that developed following Sullivan. how-
ever, was not wholly unprecedented, but had a solid foundation in common law.
Freedom of speech .had been called "a prized American privilege." Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941). Public discussion was considered a political duty
and, thus, "a fundamental principle of the American government." Whitney v,
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (footnote omitted), overruled on other grounds
per curiain, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see J. Townshend, A Treatise
on the Wrongs Called Slander and Libel 445 n.3 (4th ed. 1890). As early as 1890 the
importance of a free press, as expressed in the first amendment, was recognized in
defamation suits, as was a newspaper's duty to discuss questions of public interest
and criticize the actions of those in power. Id. See generally Noel, Defa'nation of
Public Officers and Candidates, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 875 (1949). As the Sullivan Court
noted, "[tihe general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is
secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions." 376 U.S.
at 269.
11. The first amendment to the Constitution provides, in part, that "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. Const.
amend. I.
12. 376 U.S. at 275. The Court noted that public discussion of public officials was
a "fundamental principle of the American form of government." Id. (footnote omit-
ted).
13. 376 U.S. at 269. "[T]he stake of the people in public business and the con-
duct of public officials is so great that neither the defense of truth nor the standard of
ordinary care would protect against self-censorship and thus adequately implement
First Amendment policies." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968).
see L. Eldredge, supra note 10, at 254; Frakt, The Erolcing Late of Defamation.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6
Rut.-Camn. L.J. 471, 474 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Frakt I]; Robertson, Defaination
and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 Tex. L. Rev.
199, 201 (1976).
14. 376 U.S. at 270.
15. 376 U.S. at 285-86. A showing with convincing clarity is considered "clear
and convincing proof." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30 (1971)
(plurality opinion). This standard may lie between the civil standard of prepolder-
ance of the evidence and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used in criminal
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published the allegedly defamatory material with "actual malice," a
term defined as knowing or reckless disregard for the truth. 16 Liabil-
ity based on any lesser degree of proof thwarts the central meaning of
the first amendment 17 by denying publishers the " 'breathing space' "
needed to survive, 18 thus, infringing society's opportunity to take part
in government. 19 The Sullivan decision, therefore, established pub-
law. Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 49 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078
(1980). It appears to be closer to the reasonable doubt standard. however, as it re-
quires "proof that is clear, precise and indubitable or unmistakable and free from
serious and substantial doubt." MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co.. 612 P.2d
830, 839 (Wyo. 1980).
16. 376 U.S. at 279-80. "Actual malice" is a term of art that differs considerably
from common law malice which means ill-\ill, spite, or hostility. Herbert v. Lando.
441 U.S. 153, 199 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Pierce v. Capital Cities Communi-
cations, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 506 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 439 U.S. 861 (1978). Reliance
Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1349-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Hill, D;fanmation
and Privacy Under the First Amendment. 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1205, 1249 n.199
(1976). The term "actual malice" has caused some confusion, leading the Supreme
Court to remand several cases that were decided on jury instructions that allowed
liability based on ill-will or hostility. E.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v.
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam). The
Court has suggested that courts avoid the use of the phrase in jury instructions.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18 (1971) (plurality opinion). It
has been proposed that "actual malice" be replaced wvith the more descriptive and
less confusing "scienter." MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting, 612 P.2d 830. 841
n.3 (Wyo. 1980); W. Prosser, supra note 2, at 821.
17. 376 U.S. at 273. The "central meaning" of the first amendment is "a core of
protection of speech wvithout which democracy cannot function, without which ...
'the censorial power" would be in the Government over the people and not *in the
people over the Government.' " Kalven, Tile New York Times Case: A Note on 'Tile
Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191, 208. The main
thrust of Sullivan was to allow free criticism of government. 376 U.S. at 279-80. A
degree of liability lower than reckless disregard would deter criticism of official con-
duct. Id. at 279. A lower standard would compel critics to "guarantee the truth of all
[their] factual assertions" resulting in self-censorship. Id. Cases which relied on Sul-
livan and developed the law of public figure defamation expressed the same policy
concerns. E.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149 (1967) ('The dis-
semination of the individual's opinions on matters of public interest is . . .. in the
historic words of the Declaration of Independence. an 'unalienable right' that "gov-
ernments are instituted among men to secure.' "). Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 73 (1964) ("[T]he great principles of the Constitution which secure freedom of
expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences to any except the
knowing or reckless falsehood.").
18. 376 U.S. at 271-72. The Court recognized that "erroneous st'tement is in-
evitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression
are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . to survive.*" Id. at 271-72
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
19. 376 U.S. at 274-75. "' The maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people
and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the
security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system." "
Id. at 269 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)). The Sullivan
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lie figure defamation as distinct from the common law torts of' libel 20
and slander 2 ' by raising and constitutionalizing the standard of
proof. 22
The parameters of the public official class were left undefined in
Sullivan.23  Later Supreme Court decisions openly accepted the pol-
icy underlying Sullivan, requiring even those on the periphery of
government to meet the actual malice standard. 24 The sphere of pro-
tection was most profoundly expanded by the Court in Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. c. Butts. 25  Sullivan, on its facts, held that public official
status attached when the defamatory remarks involved conduct relat-
ing to a person's official duties.2 6 The language of Sullivan, however,
Court noted Judge Learned Hand's observation that the first amendment " 'presup-
poses that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of
tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.' " 376 U.S. at 270 (quoting
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326
U.S. 1 (1945)). The Court subsequently reaffirmed this view, noting that the guaran-
tees of freedom of expression are "not for the benefit of the press so much as for the
benefit of all of us;" they are necessary for "the maintenance of our political system
and an open society." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967). It is as much the
duty of the citizen to criticize official conduct as it is the duty of the official to
administer. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964).
20. Libel is defamation in writing or by some other permanent form of comnmnuni-
cation. 1 A. Hanson, supra note 2, § 38, at 39; W. Prosser, supra note 2, § 111, at
737.
21. Slander is oral defamation. 1 A. Hanson, supra note 2, § 45; W. Prosser,
supra note 2, § 111, at 737.
22. 376 U.S. at 279-80 ("The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a fed-
eral rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made with 'actual malice'...."). The Sullivan decision "added to the tort law of the
individual States a constitutional zone of protection for errors of fact caused by negli-
gence." Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 291 (1971).
23. 376 U.S. at 283 n.23 ("We have no occasion here to determine how far down
into the lower ranks of government employees the 'public official' designation would
extend for purposes of [the actual malice] rule, or otherwise to specify categories of
persons who would or would not be included.").
24. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-32 (1968) (deputy sheriff held
public official); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82-83 (1967)
(elected court clerk held public official); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966)
(remanded to state court due to substantial argument that former supervisor of
county recreation area was public official); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357-58
(1965) (county attorney and Chief of Police held public officials); accord, Adey v.
United Action for Animals, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 457, 461-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (consul-
tant to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration held public official), aff'd
ner., 493 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 8,12 (1974). That the defilina-
tory statement is made after the official has left his post is irrelevant to a determina-
tion of his status for purposes of a libel suit. 1 A. Hanson, supra note 2, § 141, at
108.
25. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
26. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). The Court noted
that it was unnecessary to determine, at that time, "the boundaries of the 'official
conduct' concept." Id. at 283 n.23.
[Vol. 49
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was sufficiently broad, and the first amendment concerns sufficiently
compelling, to lead the Court, in Curtis. to conclude that the actual
malice standard was equally applicable to any person who gains rec-
ognition from participation in public events. 27 Thus, the term "pub-
lic figure" was born. 28
A retreat from the liberal construction of the term "public figure,"
however, can be detected over the past several years. 29  In Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 30 the Supreme Court held that private individu-
als involved in issues of public concern are not necessarily public fig-
ures. 31 Although retaining the notion that public figure status can
27. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts. 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) In Curtis. the
plaintiff, a university athletic director involved in a bribery scrandal, was considered a
public figure because "public interest in education in general, and in the conduct of
the athletic affairs of educational institutions in particular, justifies constitutional pro-
tection of discussion of persons involved in it." hd. at 146. In a companion case, a
retired Army General, active in a dispute concerning federally enforced school intt-
gration, was deemed a public figure due to "the important public interest in being
informed about the events and personalities involved in the . . . riot" in which he
participated. Id. Focusing on the issue with which a person is associated to deter-
mine public figure status was reaffirmed in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia. Inc.. 403
U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion), where the Court held that private individuals in-
volved in issues of public concern are subject to the actual malice standard. hi. at
43-44. Noting that the " 'profound national committment to ... debate' " stressed in
Sullivan referred to public issues, id. at 43 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)), the Court stated that "[dirawing a distinction between
'public' and 'private' figures makes no sense in terms of the First Amendment
guarantees." Id. at 45-46 (footnote omitted). A subject is equally worthy of public
attention and comment whether a participant is "famous or anonymous." hi. at 44
(footnote omitted).
28. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Court defined
"public figure" as one who has "attained that status by position alone" or by "pur-
poseful activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the 'vortex' of an
important public controversy." Id. at 155. The Court relied on the common law
definition of public figure as it related to the tort of invasion of privacy, Id. at 154. At
common law, a person who, by his accomplishments or profession, gave the public a
legitimate interest in his activities, was a public figure, even if he had sought no
attention. Restatement of Torts § 867, Comment c (1939); Hunsaker, Adequate
Breathing Space in a Poisonous Atmosphere: Balancing Freedom and Responsibility
in the Open Society, 16 Duq. L. Rev. 9, 20 (1977).
29. K. Devol, Mass Media and the Supreme Court 232 (2d ed. 1976). L. El-
dredge, supra note 10, § 52, at 282; Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship. 53
Tex. L. Rev. 422, 451-52 (1975); Frakt, Defamation Since Gertz v. Robert Welch.
Inc.: The Emerging Common Law, 10 Rut.-Cam. L.J. 519, 528 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Frakt II]; Kovner, Disturbing Trends in the Law of Defamation: A Publish-
ing Attorney's Opinion, 3 Hastings Const. L.Q. 363, 365-67 (1976); Tybor. supra
note 8, at 26, col. 1; News Notes, supra note 8.
30. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
31. Id. at 347. The Court allowed "the States [to] define for themselves the ap-
propriate standard" to be met by private individuals, Id. Only strict liability w%-as
precluded. Id. Several states have settled on a negligence standard. E.g.. Cahill v.
1980]
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arise from participation in public issues, the Court emphasized the
voluntariness of that participation. 32  A plaintiff must, through his
own actions, "invite attention and comment" to become a public fig-
ure. 33 Therefore, the central focus for determining which plaintiffs
must meet the high constitutional standard shifted from the issue in-
Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975); Troman v.
Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216
Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d
688 (1976); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161
(1975); Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E. W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d
105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin v, Griffin
Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86
Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976). Other states have opted for a test requiring pri-
vate figures involved in public issues to show actual malice. E.g., Walker v. Colorado
Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975);
Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind.
App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); LeBeouf v.
Times Picayune Publishing Corp., 327 So. 2d 430 (La. Ct. App. 1976). At least one
state has adopted an intermediate standard, requiring a showing of "gross irresponsi-
bility" when private individuals are involved in issues of public concern. Chapadeau
v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 200, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571, 379
N.Y.S.2d 61, 65 (1975); Grobe v. Three Village Herald, 69 A.D.2d 175, 176, 420
N.Y.S.2d 3, 4 (2d Dep't 1979) (per curiam), aff'd mer., 49 N.Y.2d 932, 406 N.E.2d
491, 428 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1980).
32. 418 U.S. at 345 ("Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a
public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly
involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare."); Robertson, supra note 13, at
222-23 ("The Gertz decision clearly implies that unless plaintiff is a household
name, he will not incur public figure status without voluntary publicity-secking on
his part." (footnote omitted)). The common law definition employed in Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967), included those who sought uo
attention. See note 28 supra. Thus, the Court in Gertz narrowed the category
acknowledged at common law. The standards by which public figure status is deter-
mined according to Curtis and according to Gertz are similar. Robertson, so pra note
13, at 224. The Curtis Court noted that public status may be achieved "by position
alone" or through "purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of [one's] personality
into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). Similarly, Gertz referred to public figures as those who
"have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society" and are deemed
public for all purposes and those who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues in-
volved." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 3,15 (1974). The emphasis, how-
ever, is significantly different. Robertson, supra note 13, at 224-25. Voluntary par-
ticipation is stressed in Gertz. As Justice Blackmun noted, under the Gertz test, only
a person who "literally or figuratively 'mounts a rostrum' to advocate a particular
view" becomes a public figure. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 169
(1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
33. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). The motivation for
participation must be a desire to resolve the relevant issues. Id.; Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976).
[Vol. 49
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volved to the nature of the individual's involvenent,34 inevitably de-
creasing the number in that category. 35
The type of activity in which one must voluntarily participate to
acquire public figure status was not addressed in Gertz. In Time, Inc.
v. Firestone,3 6 however, the Court, confronted with this question,
adopted a narrow construction of "public issue." It "reject[ed] the
notion [implicit in earlier decisions] that a controversy is *public' be-
cause it excites popular interest."3 7
Finally, it is noteworthy that prior to Gertz. the Supreme Court
repeatedly held plaintiffs to be public figures.38 Since Gertz, it has
unanimously found plaintiffs to be private individuals. 39 The result
is an increase in the number of plaintiffs who may recover on evi-
dence falling short of actual malice and a consequent decrease in the
protection previously afforded publishers."0
34. Hill, supra note 16, at 1213 (The "'new formula" of Gertz required -a focus
on persons rather than issues."). The Court abandoned the "public or general con-
cern test employed in Rosenbloon v. Metromedia. Inc., 403 U.S. 29. 44 (1971)
(plurality opinion). Eaton, The American Lair Of Defamation Through Gertz -.
Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer. 61 Va. L. Re\% 1349. 1402-03
(1975); Frakt I, supra note 13, at 486; Frakt II, supra note 29. at 524-25; Hill. supra
note 16, at 1212; see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448. 489 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
35. Robertson, supra note 13, at 222 (The Gertz formulation signals a narrowing
of the public figure category.). Justice Brennan noted that Gertz wvas indeed a cut-
back on the scope of the Sullivan decision, as it had developed. Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone, 424 U.S. 448, 474 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
37. Hill, supra note 16, at 1214 (footnote omitted). In Rosenbloomn -. Metro-
media, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion), the Court had mentioned that
"constitutional protection was not intended to be limited to matters bearing broadly
on issues of responsible government." Id. at 42. In Firestone. as in Gertz. the Court
failed to define specifically what makes a controversy public. Hill. supra note 16, at
1214..
38. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion) (dis-
tributor of obscene magazines held public figure). Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n
v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (prominent local real estate developer held public fig-
ure); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (university athletic director
and retired Army General held public figures).
39. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (individual failing to
respond to Grand Jury subpoena regarding investigation of Soviet espionage held
private individual); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (government-
subsidized scientist held private individual); Time. Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448
(1976) (member of wealthy, well-known family held private individual); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (prominent attorney representing family of
young man allegedly killed by Chicago policeman held private individual). It has
been noted that the Firestone Court narrowed the definition of public figure by "pre-
sumably excluding socialites, entertainers and similar persons." K. Devol, supra note
29, at 232.
40. See K. Devol, supra note 29, at 232; L. Eldredge, supra note 10, § 52, at
282. See generally Tybor, supra note 8, at 1, col. 1. Those who do not have to show
actual malice are more likely to sue. See K. Devol, supra note 29, at 232. As a
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In this context, footnote nine is particularly ominous. Viewed in
accord with the trend, footnote nine has received much attention and
courts have already struggled to reconcile their decisions with it.41
The result is a distortion of a sound procedural remedy.
II. THE IMPACT OF FOOTNOTE NINE
A. Summary Judgment in Public Figure Defamation
Determination of liability in public figure defamation requires a
subjective inquiry; 42 proof of actual malice must be "brought home"
to the defendant.4 3 Although, as a general proposition, state of mind
result, publishers may forego publication rather than risk liability. Kovner, supra
note 29, at 369. The narrower definition of public figure will cause "names of some
[persons involved in public issues to be] stricken from newsworthy stories, ...
tend[ing] to distort the news." Id. Additionally, it has been noted that one result of
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), is the increasing difficulty pub-
lishers will encounter in determining who is a public figure. Frakt I, supra note 13,
at 487; see Who's a Public Figure? You Figure It Out, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 21, 1980, at
26, col. 1. This difficulty is evident in several decisions in which judges concur as to
the proper standard to apply but sharply disagree as to the result on particular facts.
E.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Dodrill v. Arkansas
Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076
(1980). One federal court noted that even under the Gertz test, Gertz himself could
have been deemed a public figure. Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041,
1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Perhaps if attorney Gertz was not a public figure, nobody is."
(footnote omitted)), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 834'(1977); see Anderson, supra note 29, at 448; Robertson, supra note 13, at
221-22.
41. See notes 5 & 8 supra.
42. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); Van-
denburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 1975); Washington Post
Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011
(1967); Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 5 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1174, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 619 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 79-1987); Schultz v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 468 F. Supp. 551, 564 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Hoffman v. Washington Post
Co., 433 F. Supp. 600, 605 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), affd mem., 538 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1976).
43. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964) ("[T]he state of
mind required for actual malice [has] to be brought home to the persons . . . having
responsibility for the publication .... "); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731
(1968); Bezanson, Herbert v. Lando, Editorial Judgment and Freedom of the Press:
An Essay, 1978 U. IlI. L.F. 605, 625, Hill, supra note 16, at 1211 n.19; Note,
Defamation and the First Amendment: Editorial Process Found Privileged in Herbert
v. Lando, 13 Tulsa L.J. 837, 844 (1978). One commentator noted that the Supreme
Court has been "neither clear nor consistent" regarding whether it favors an objec-
tive or a subjective test of actual malice. Id. at 849. At least once the Court seemed
to adopt an objective standard by defining reckless disregard as "an extreme depar-
ture from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by re-
sponsible publishers." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). This
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offenses are inappropriate for summary disposition,44 footnote nine
should not signal automatic foreclosure of the possibility of summary
judgment in public figure defamation.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits summary
disposition of actions when there are no material issues to be deter-
mined by a fact-finder. 45  The elements of a cause of action and the
requisite degree of proof are incorporated into the consideration of a
motion for summary judgment.46 Failure to show sufficient evidence
of an element is failure to establish the existence of a factual issue as
to that element. 47 In public figure defamation, the requirement of
case was not explicitly overruled, but the Court, soon after, in emphasizing the sub-
jectivity of the standard, stated that "reckless conduct is not measured by whether a
reasonably prudent man wou~ld have published, or would have investigated before
publishing," St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968), and that the defen-
dant must have "entertained serious doubts" prior to publication. Id. The Court
mentioned, however, that certain objective criteria could be used in determining the
state of mind. Id. at 732. For example, if a story were based on an unverified
anonymous telephone call, actual malice could be inferred, hd. Similarly, "'allegations
. . .so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them in circu-
lation" may create an inference of actual malice. hd. The same might be true if there
were "obvious reasons" for the reporter to doubt the veracity of his source. hi. It
appears that, although the standard is highly subjective, the Court has made some
effort to create objective guidelines so that public figure defamation will not operate
in a vacuum, and publishers will be forewarned as to what actions might create liabil-
ity. As in other areas which require a measuring of professional conduct. "the cus-
toms and practices of the profession should provide the norm against which the
reasonableness of the defendant's conduct is measured." Anderson. supra note 29, at
466 & n.203.
44. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam). Poller
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). 10 C. %%'right & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2730, at 583-84 (1973). 6 J. Moore, Federal
Practice 56.17[41.-1], at 56-930 (2d ed. 1980). Relevant information may be within
the exclusive knowledge of one of the litigants, making it difficult to show the ab-
sence, or the existence, of an issue. 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 2730. at
583-84.
45. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary
judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories, and admissions on file, together %vith the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Sec generally 10 C. \%'right & A.
Miller, supra note 44, § 2712. The summar' judgment rule in most states is the
same as the Federal Rule. D. Paston, Summar' Judgment 23 (1963). For analytical
purposes, this Note uses Rule 56 as the benchmark of summary judgment procedure.
46. 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 44. § 2727. To grant a motion for
summary judgment, the court must be satisfied that the plaintiff can offer no compe-
tent evidence that could support a verdict in his favor, Id. at 531. "[T~he evidence
offered must have the force needed to allow a jury to rely on it .... " hd. at 543.
Evidence which is without force is insufficient to raise an issue of material fact. hd. at
542.
47. Id.; see Donnelly v. Guion, 467 F.2d 290, 294 (2d Cir. 1972). On a motion
for summary judgment the court's sole dut' is to determine whether an issue of Fact
remains. Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co.. 524 F.2d 1317, 1318-20 (2d Cir.
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proof of actual malice with convincing olarity creates a greater likeli-
hood that summary judgment can be properly granted. 48
The actual malice standard requires conduct of an egregious nature
amounting to recklessness. 49 A defendant must have "in fact enter-
tained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." 50 Upon
1975); 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice, supra note 44, 56.15[l], at 56-391. It may
neither resolve the issue nor weigh conflicting evidence or inferences. United States
v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam); Sartor v. Arkansas Natural
Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 628 (1944); Woods v. Hearst Corp., 2 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1548, 1550 (D. Md. 1977).
48. Southard v. Forbes, Inc., 588 F.2d 140, 145-46 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 832 (1979); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 864 (5th Cir.
1970); Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 573 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
922 (1969); United Medical Labs., Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., M04
F.2d 706, 712 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969); Ethridge v. North
Mississippi Communications, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 347, 351 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Jenof
v. Hearst Corp., 453 F. Supp. 541, 547 (D. Md. 1978), Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's,
442 F. Supp. 1341, 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated
Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Fadell v. Minneapolis Star and
Tribune Co., 425 F. Supp. 1075, 1086 (N.D. Ind. 1976), aff'd, 557 F.2d 107 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071,
1075 (N.D. Cal. 1969), affd per curiant, 449 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1971); Anderson,
supra note 29, at 456-58; Hill, supra note 16, at 1218 n.63.
49. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287-88 (1964). Actual malice
requires an "extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting
ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130, 155 (1967); e.g., Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 383-84 (4th Cir.
1971); Dacey v. Florida Bar, Inc., 427 F.2d 1292, 1295 (5th Cir. 1970); Oliver v.
Village Voice, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Cerrito v. Time, Inc.,
302 F. Supp. 1071, 1075 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 449 F.2d 306 (9th Cir.
1971). The plaintiff must show that the defendant had a "high degree of awareness of
... probable falsity." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); e.g., Arnheiter
v. Random House, Inc., 578 F.2d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
931 (1979); Grzelak v. Calumet Publishing Co., 543 F.2d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 1975).
Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 385 (4th Cir. 1971); Washington Post Co. v.
Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967);
Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F. Supp. 600, 605 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd rem.,
578 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Fadell v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., 425 F.
Supp. 1075, 1083 (N.D. Ind. 1976), affd, 557 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 966 (1977).
50. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 '1968); e.g., Pierce v. Capital
Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 508 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861
(1978); Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 572 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
922 (1969); Gray v. Udevitz, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1412, 1413 (D. Wyo. 1979)
Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 5 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1174, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 619 F.2d 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 79-1987); Logan v. District of Co-
lumbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (D.D.C. 1978). Hoffman v. Washington Post Co.,
433 F. Supp. 600, 605 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd ment., 578 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 822 (N.D. Cal.
1977); Samborsky v. Hearst Corp., 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1638, 1639 (D. Md.
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consideration of a summary judgment motion, the court must be satis-
fied that the plaintiff could reveal to the jury evidence of reckless
disregard, and, moreover, that a reasonable jury could infer that state
of mind with convincing clarity.5  Accordingly, "'where the actual
malice standard of [Sullivan] is applicable, the granting of summary
judgment is the rule, rather than the exception because of the diffi-
culty encountered by a plaintiff in showving the existence of actual
malice." 52
Contrasting public figure defamation with defamation of private in-
dividuals further demonstrates the appropriateness of summary judg-
ment in the public figure area. According to Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,53 a private individual need only show negligence by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.5 4 Therefore, "a determination that the
1977); Fadell v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., 425 F. Supp. 1075. 1083 (N.D.
Ind. 1976), affd, 557 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977), Oliver
v. Village Voice, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 235, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Buchanan v. As-
sociated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196. 1203 (D.D.C. 1975).
51. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130. 174 (1967) (Brennan. J.. con-
curring); Mistrot v. True Detective Publishing Corp., 467 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir.
1972); Dacey v. Florida Bar, Inc., 427 F.2d 1292, 1295 (5th Cir. 1970), Wasserman v.
Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920, 922 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., concurring), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 940 (1970); Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324. 336 (2d Cir. 1969). cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970); Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328.
1332 (D.D.C. 1978); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's. 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1350
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F. Supp. 600, 604-05
(D.D.C. 1977), aff'd nere., 578 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The court's pre-trial role
is to "ascertain whether there is evidence by which a jury could reasonably find
liability under the constitutionally required instructions." Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 174 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring); set 3 E. Devitt & C.
Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 84.09, at 100 (3d ed. 1977). The
elements of defamation which are to be determined by the jury are "[slubject to the
control of the court." Restatement (Second) of Torts 617 (1977). The constitutional
aspect of public figure defamation adds another dimension to the "normal controls
possessed by a court under the common law or under state procedural statutes or
rules of civil procedure." Id., Comment b. Close scrutiny of the constitutional issues
is required of the courts at each level of the litigation and each "may decide that the
evidence is constitutionally inadequate to sustain the jury determination." Id. The
Court takes the "determination of reckless disregard [from] the unquestioned judg-
ment of juries" to allow publishers flexibility in exercising their first amendment
rights. Anderson, supra note 29, at 457. Thus, the sufficiency of the evidence with
which the allegedly defamed person must come forth is "for judicial determination."
Arnheiter v. Random House, Inc., 578 F.2d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 931 (1979).
52. Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 453 F. Supp. 541, 547 (D. Md. 1978).
53. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
54. Id. at 366 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court refused to allow recovery to
private individuals without some showing of fault, the requisite degree to be deter-
mined by the states. Id. at 347; see note 31 supra. The Court rejected extension of
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applicable standard is that of Sullivan rather than Gertz substantially
enhances the possibility of a summary disposition in favor of the de-
fendant." 55  For instance, in Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 56 the plaintiff
was adjudicated a private individual and, because evidence sufficient
to create an issue of negligence had been offered, defendant's motion
for summary judgment was denied. 57 Noting that the evidence did
not indicate an issue of actual malice, however, the court acknowl-
edged that had the plaintiff been a public figure, summary judgment
would have been granted. 58
The requirement of proof of actual malice with convincing clarity
was adopted to prevent "dainpen[ing] the vigor and limit[ing] the va-
riety of public debate." 59 Footnote nine may have been motivated
in part by a concern that frequent grants of summary judgment re-
sulted from undue reliance on that policy. There is no indication,
however, that courts have exceeded the bounds of Rule 56 to afford
additional protection to defendants sued for public figure defama-
tion.60 It is true that in granting summary judgment courts often
appear to rely on the first amendment consideration underlying Suli-
van.61 More accurately, however, the decisions are based on the
the Sullivan standard to private individuals because it believed the states' interest in
compensating injury to reputation was paramount to protection of defamatory mate-
rial which was not of public concern. 418 U.S. at 343
55. Hill, supra note 16, at 1218 n.63; accord, Anderson, supra note 29, at 456-
58.
56. 453 F. Supp. 541 (D. Md. 1978).
57. Id. at 548. It was undisputed that the defendant's reporters never spoke with
the source of their article, relying primarily on a statement purportedly written by
him, which they had obtained from a third party. Id. at 547. Furthermore, it was
clear that the reporters were unaware that the source had a criminal record and that
the person who delivered the statement had also engaged in extensive criminal activ-
ity. id.
58. Id.
59. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
60. 47 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 286, 315 n.163 (1978) ("[D]espite dicta indicating
sympathy for summary judgment motions in libel actions, whether courts actually
employ a different standard in reviewing those motions is questionable."). See also
Comment, The Use of Summary Judgment in Defamation Cases, 14 U.S.F.L. Rev.
77, 82-83 (1979). One court cautioned that, although courts must keep the chilling
effect of libel suits in mind, they should grant summary judgment only where, on
close analysis, it is appropriate under the Federal Rules. Schuster v. U.S. News &
World Report, Inc., 602 F.2d 850, 855 (8th Cir. 1979).
61. Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 510 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861 (1978); Guam Fed'n of Teachers Local 1581 v. Ysrael, 492
F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v,
Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 864-65 (5th Cir. 1970); Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365
F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967); Ethridge v,
North Mississippi Communications, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 347, 351 (N.D. Miss. 1978);
Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 453 F. Supp. 541, 543 (D. Md. 1978); Fadell v. Minneapolis
Vol. 49
PRESERVING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
lack of evidence of the requisite degree and recognition that unneces-
sary trials hinder free expression. 62
One court, for instance, noted that the importance of guaranteeing
first amendment freedoms places public figure defamation cases in a
"somewhat different category," but continued by acknowledging its
duty to grant summary judgment because a trial on the evidence pre-
sented vas "not really warranted."6' Similarly, another court ob-
served that "to facilitate free debate ...courts have more and more
taken the position that the First Amendment issues . . . should be
disposed of on summary judgment." 64 This court, however, also cor-
rectly granted summary judgment due to plaintiff's failure to present
some evidence of actual malice. 65
The statement that "because of the importance of free speech,
summary judgment is the 'rule,' and not the exception, in [public
figure] defamation cases," 66 fails to make explicit an essential step in
the court's reasoning. The shorthand means -that the importance of
free speech dictates the high standard required to prove liability, and
the standard, in turn, makes summary judgment the rule.6 7 Prior to
Hutchinson c. Proxm ire,68 summary judgment had been properly
applied in public figure defamation. 69  Although footnote nine does
Star and Tribune Co., 425 F. Supp. 1075, 1085-86 (N.D. Ind. 1976). affd. 557 F.2d
107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977), Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening
Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947. 955 (D.D.C. 1976); Rosanova v. Playboy
Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 448-49 (S.D. Ga. 1976), affd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th
Cir. 1978); Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196. 1205 (D.D.C. 1975).
Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd
mem., 538 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1976).
62. See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text.
63. Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565. 566 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 395 U.S.
922 (1969).
64. Fadell v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co.. 425 F. Supp. 1075, 1085 (N.D.
Ind. 1976), affd, 557 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 966 (1977.
65. Id. at 1088.
66. Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (footnote and emphasis omitted), affd nem., 538 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1976).
67. Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 453 F. Supp. 541. 547 (D. Md. 1978). see note 48
supra and accompanying text.
68. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
69. E.g., Southard v. Forbes, Inc., 588 F.2d 140, 146 (5th Cir.), c'rt. denied,
444 U.S. 832 (1979); Grzelak v. Calumet Publishing Co.. 543 F.2d 579, 583 (7th Cir.
1975); Dacey v. Florida Bar, Inc., 427 F.2d 1292, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970); Time, Inc. v.
McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 573 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969); Cm v.
Udevitz, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1412, 1413 (D. Wvo. 1979); Reliance Ins. Co. v.
Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Trans World Accounts, Inc. v.
Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Woods v. Hearst Corp., 2
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1548, 1550-51 (D. Md. 1977); Fadell v. Minneapolis Star and
Tribune Co., 425 F. Supp. 1075, 1087-88 (N.D. Ind. 1976). affd. 557 F.2d 107 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star
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not flatly preclude summary judgment, it clearly suggests that the
summary procedure should be severely curtailed. 70 Consequently,
lower courts have become decidedly confused in their analyses of mo-
tions for summary judgment in public figure defamation. 71
One federal court, in reliance on footnote nine, denied defendants'
summary judgment motion. 72  Even though it recognized that the
evidence adduced by the plaintiff seemed to create an "insurmounta-
ble barrier" to his case, 73 the court stated that the actual malice stan-
Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 961 (D.D.C. 1976); Buchanan v. Associated
Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196, 1204-05 (D.D.C. 1975); Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd nere., 538 F.2d 309 (2d Cir.
1976); Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071, 1075-76 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd per
curian, 449 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1971).
70. News Notes, supra note 8. One federal court which attempted to interpret
the Supreme Court's intention in footnote nine concluded that the dicta "not only
states 'doubt' [that summary judgment is the rule rather than the exception in public
figure defamation actions], but takes almost the opposite position." Yiamouyiannis v.
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 619 F.2d 932, 939 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 79-1987).
71. Several courts have refused to incorporate the burden of proof into the con-
sideration of a motion for summary judgment. Hart v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 5
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1811 (D. Kan. 1979); Church of Scientology v. Siegelman, 475
F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). One court, in an attempt to construe and adhere to
footnote nine went to great lengths to delineate the "conflicting views on the precise
procedure to be used by the trial court at the summary judgment stage." Nader v. de
Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 45 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980). The
court found two views-the first employed the normal Rule 56 procedure as ex-
pressed in Guam Fed'n of Teachers Local 1581 v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974), and a second, encompassed by.Judge Wright's
concurrence in Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 398
U.S. 940 (1970), which the court considered a departure from normal summary
judgment law. 408 A.2d at 46. In Wasserman, Judge Wright had propounded that
"[Sullivan] makes actual malice a constitutional issue to be decided in the first in-
stance by the trial judge applying the [Sullivan] test .... Unless the court finds, on
the basis of pretrial affidavits, depositions or other documentary evidence, that the
plaintiff can prove actual malice in the [Sullivan] sense, it should grant summary
judgment for the defendant." 424 F.2d at 922 (Wright, J., concurring) (footnote and
citation omitted). Judge Wright's proposal is, in fact, no different from the test used
in Guam; the Nader court "create[d] a non-existent debate." Nader v. de Toledano,
408 A.2d 31, 60 (D.C. 1979) (Harris, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
72. Hart v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1811, 1814 (D.
Kan. 1979).
73. Id. The allegedly defamatory material charged plaintiff, an agent with the
United States Bureau of Narcotics, with various unethical practices relating to his
job. Id. at 1811. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the inherent bias of the article,
defendants' failure to investigate, and the reliance on only one oral source were suffi-
cient evidence of reckless disregard to defeat a motion for summary judgment, Id. at
1814. The court recognized, however, that many of plaintiffs arguments were not
relevant to the issue of actual malice. Id.; see Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290
(1971) (liability resulting from editorial judgment does not constitute actual malice);
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (failure to make a prior investiga-
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dard may not be prejudged. 74  Similarly, another federal court de-
nied summary judgment to a defendant although noting that plaintiff's
evidence was "far from convincing." 7 5 These courts clearly failed to
find a genuine issue as to defendant's actual malice. In denying sum-
mary judgment, they failed to correctly apply Rule 56.76
Several courts have expounded a "neutral approach" in an attempt
to comply with the Supreme Court dicta. 77  In Yiamouyiannis v.
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.. 78 the court held that for
procedural purposes public figure defamation is to be treated the
same as other civil actions. 79 "'[A]ny 'chilling effect' caused by the
defense of a lawsuit itself, is simply to be disregarded, to have no
force and effect." 8 0  Seeking the existence of a genuine issue of fact
for trial, the court held that "no reasonable jury could find with con-
vincing clarity on the facts .. . that [defendants] acted with actual
malice." 81 The court affirmed the trial court's finding that the plain-
tion does not constitute actual malice): Time. Inc. v. McLanev. 406 F.2d 565, 570-71
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969) (publisher's justifiable reliance on a
source does not constitute actual malice).
74. Hart v. Playboy Enterprises. Inc., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1811. 1814 (D.
Kan. 1979).
75. Church of Scientology v. Siegehnan. 475 F. Supp. 950. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
The court noted that it felt "constrained, in view of the [Hutchinson ] footnote, to
deny the motion." Id. at 956 n.16.
76. Although the court denied summary judgment in Church of Scientology v.
Siegelman, 475 F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). it did so "without prejudice ... to a
subsequent motion upon completion of additional discovery." Id. at 958. Requiring
further discovery' for an unfounded claim, however, can inhibit free speech. Fadell v.
Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., 425 F. Supp. 1075, 1085 (N. D. Ind. 1976), aff'd,
557 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 966 (1977). In granting summary
judgment, the court in Fadell noted that the expense of the voluminous discovery,
which had consumed nearly four years, tended to have a chilling effect on the exer-
cise of first amendment rights. Id'. see Oakes, Proof of Actual Malice in Dfaination
Actions: An Unsolved Dilemma, 7 Hofstra L. Rev. 655, 712 (1979). Later develop-
ments in Church of Scientology suggest that the denial of summary judgment was
erroneous. The case was dismissed due to the plaintiffs' refusal to make discovery.
Church of Scientology v. Siegelman. No. 79 Civ. 1166. slip op. at 1 (S.D.N.Y. May
30, 1980). The defendants' attorney remarked that the defamation action was
" clearly frivolous,' " Nat'l L.J., Aug. 4. 1980. at 6, col. 1 (quoting Mel WVlf. Esq.).
and a $4 million lawsuit for malicious prosecution has been initiated, Id.
77. Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of the United States. Inc.. 619 F.2d 932,
940 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 49 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Oct. 7. 1980) (No. 79-19S71;
Loeb v. New Times Communications Corp., 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 143s, 1443
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Whelan, 492 F. Supp. 374, 379
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Mount v. Sadik, No. 78 Civ. 22279. slip op. at 12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
7, 1980); Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 50 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1078 (1980).
78. 619 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 49 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Oct 7,
1980) (No. 79-1987).
79. Id. at 940.




tiffis evidence was "grossly inadequate to raise even an inference of
actual malice, much less the clear and convincing proof necessary to
survive a motion for summary judgment."'8 2  Although ultimately
adopting the proper approach for summary judgment motions,83 the
Yiamouyiannis court expressed the erroneous belief that its holding
significantly altered settled law. 84 In fact, the "neutral approach" is
not novel, but has long been the basis for consideration of motions for
summary judgment in public figure defamation. 85
The approach to be applied to summary judgment motions neither
favors plaintiffs or defendants, nor enhances or restricts the right of
free expression.8 6 It is a consideration of the evidence, in the light
most favorable to the opposing party,8 7 to determine if the evidence
submitted is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find actual malice
with convincing clarity.88 By failing to recognize settled procedural
principles, footnote nine has led to distortion of summary judgment.
Additionally, adherence to it may result in abridgment of first
amendment freedom, a direct consequence of improper denial of
summary judgment.
B. Suminary Judgment and Protection
of Free Speech
The chilling effect of unnecessary defamation suits often can be al-
leviated by proper use of summary judgment. 89  It has been noted
82. Yiamouviannis v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 5 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1174, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 619 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 79-1987).
83. See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text.
84. Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 619 F.2d 932,
939-40 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 79-
1987).
85. Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 60 (D.C. 1979) (Harris, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980) (The incorporation of the
actual malice standard into the consideration of a motion for summary judgment has
been "explicitly acknowledged" by "virtually every court dealing with the subject.");
see note 69 supra.
86. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
87. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam); Poller
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962); Bailey v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 565 F.2d 826, 830 (2d Cir. 1977); 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 44, § 2716, at 430. The allegations of the opposing party will be taken as true,
and he will receive the benefit of the doubt as to conflicting assertions. Time, Inc. v.
McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 571-72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969); Oliver
v. Village Voice, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 235, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Buchanan v. As-
sociated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196, 1205 (D.D.C. 1975); 10 C. Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 44, § 2716, at 430-32.
88. See note 51 supra.
89. Southard v. Forbes, Inc., 588 F.2d 140, 145 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
832 (1979); Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 441 F.2d 378, 379 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
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that summary judgment is the "best procedural protection" for first
amendment rights.90  Footnote nine, however, strikes a "potentially
crippling legal blow" to those speaking out on public issues.91 Treated
as a directive by lower courts, the effect of the Supreme Court's
doubt as to the appropriateness of summary judgment is to under-
mine first amendment policies inherent in public figure defamation. 92
Public figure defamation involves a balancing of the right to reputa-
tion valued by the individual against the interest in free expression
valued by both the media and the public.93 In Gertz r. Robert
Welch, Inc.,94 the Supreme Court acknowledged the tension that
"necessarily exists between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited
press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury." 95
Consideration of summary judgment adds another dimension to the
already precarious balance. 9 6 In the area of public figure defamation,
nied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); Washington Post Co. v. Keogh. 365 F.2d 965. 98 (D.C.
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967). Yiamouviannis v. Consumers Union of
the United States, Inc., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1174. 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd,
619 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 49 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Oct. 7. 1980) (No.
79-1987); Fadell v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co.. 425 F. Supp. 1075, 1085
(N.D. Ind. 1976), affd, 557 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 966 (1977).
Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196. 1205 (D.D.C. 1975). Cerrito v.
Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071, 1075-76 (N. D. Cal. 1969). aff'd per curiam. 449 F.2d
306 (9th Cir. 1971); Note, The Role of Summarj Judgment in Political Libel Cases, 52
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1783, 1800-01 (1979).
90. MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 612 P.2d 830, 831 (Wyo. 1980);
see cases cited note 89 supra.
91. Tybor, supra note 8, at 1, col. 3. The footnote has been termed "'the
greatest portent of hard times'" in the area of public figure defamation. Id, at 27.
col. 3 (quoting Robert Sack, Esq.).
92. See Hentoff, supra note 8, at 21, col. 3. Tybor, supra note 8. at 27. col 3.
93. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). The Stilliran Court
acknowledged that "[wihatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of
free debate." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 272 (1964) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson. 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied.
317 U.S. 678 (1942)). The competing interests in public figure defamation were rec-
ognized early. "A good reputation . . .is not only one of the most satisfying sources
of a man's own contentment, but . . .one of the most productive kinds of capital he
can possess." Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711. 721. 98 P. 281. 28.5 (1905). The
Coleman court noted that "'[w]here the public welfare is concerned the individual
must frequently endure injury to his reputation without reinedy." Id. at 722. 9S P. at
285. Other courts have recognized the necessary balancing process. Eg., Rosanova
v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc.. 580 F.2d 859, 862 (5th Cir. 1978). Pierce ". Capital
Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 496-97 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
861 (1978); Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1024. 1026 (5th Cir. 1975).
94. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
95. Id. at 342.
96. Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., 489 F. Supp. 481, 487 (D. Mass. 1980) CThe
use of summary judgment . . .must balance two competing interests: the obligation
to avoid 'chilling' the exercise of treasured First Amendment rights, and caution to
avoid foreclosing a genuine issue of fact.").
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an improper denial of summary judgment may curtail first amend-
ment freedoms. 97
The purposes of summary judgment are perfectly harmonious with
the policy on which the Sullivan rule is based. The harassment and
expense sought to be avoided by proper application of summary
judgment9 8 characterize the chilling effect and consequent self-
censorship unnecessary litigation would cause among publishers.99 In
the first amendment area, useless litigation is more than just a costly
inconvenience; at stake is the free debate so coveted in our soci-
ety. 100  The overwhelming expense of even a successfully defended
defamation action 101 indicates that the threat of litigation itself causes
97. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 865 (5th Cir. 1970),
Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denhd.
385 U.S. 1011 (1967); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F.
Supp. 947, 961 (D.D.C. 1976); Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196,
1205 (D.D.C. 1975).
98. Summary judgment is an ideal tool for ferreting out unfounded claims, the
ultimate determination of which may come too late to prevent unnecessary expense
for, and harassment of, the defendant. 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 44, §
2712, at 371-74. The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials. Id.
at 372. A trial is unnecessary if there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 370.
Summary judgment cannot be used, however, to deprive a litigant of a trial if a
genuine issue exists, Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464t (1962):
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944); 10 C. Wright & A. Mil-
ler, supra note 44, § 2712, at 381-82, and courts are generally reluctant to deprive a
litigant of the opportunity to present his case to a jury. Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406
F.2d 565, 571 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969). The constitutionality of
the procedure has rarely been challenged, 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 44,
§ 2714, at 413, because the rule does not deprive a party of the right to trial, but is
merely the means to frame the issue, if any, to see if trial is necessary. Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902).
99. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (Without the ac-
tual malice standard, "would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voic-
ing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true . . . . because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expen:e of having to do so." (em-
phasis added)); Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967) ("The threat of being put to the defense of a
lawsuit brought by a popular public official may be as chilling to the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the lawsuit itself ....").
100. Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967) (If harassment by useless litigation succeeds, the stake
is free debate.); Anderson, supra note 29, at 434 ("A system of free expression is not
secure if it must rely on the press to subordinate economic self-interest to tle
abstract principle of free speech.").
101. To mitigate the expense of litigation, publishers can purchase libel insurance
policies. Recently, they, are doing so "at an unprecedented rate." Tybor, supra note
8, at 26, col. 3. Publishers are, in addition, increasing the amounts of their coverage.
Id. at 26, col. 4. Furthermore, the amount of the risk has increased dramatically. " 'A
few years ago it was the unusual risk that warranted limits in excess of a million
dollars.... [n]ow, it is the unusual risk that doesn't warrant limits of at least a
million.' " Id. (quoting Rodger Rudnick).
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potential defendants to " 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' "102
and act as self-censors. 10 3
Economic disincentives to publish material which could result in
libel litigation are potent. The initial cost of defending a libel suit was
$20,000 as much as five years ago104 and could easily cost much
more. The successful defense of Rosenbloom r. Metromedia, Inc. 105
in 1971, for example, reportedly cost close to $100,000.106 It is not
surprising that publishers believe they - 'cannot -afford the luxury of
winning a libel action' " and consequently engage in self-
censorship. 107
One blatant example involves a journalism review which deleted
parts of an article it would have other\\vise printed so as to avoid
possible legal action.108 Although convinced it could succeed on the
merits in such a suit,' 0 9 the belief that "the cost of defending it might
easily bankrupt the magazine" caused a decision that "'the risk was
not worth it." 110
102. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254. 279 (1964) (quoting Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
103. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). In St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), the Court adhered to the view that "'to insure the
ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the
First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.*' Id. at
732. While "calculated falsehoods" and deliberate lies are not constitutionally pro-
tected, Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). the "strategy" of Sulliran is
that "speech be overprotected in order to assure that it is not underprotected." Kal-
ven, supra note 17, at 213. "The sole basis for protecting publishers who spread false
information is that otherwise the truth would too often be suppressed." Ocala Star-
Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 301 (1971) (White, J., concurring).
104. Anderson, supra note 29, at 435-36.
105. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (pluralit' opinion).
106. Anderson, supra note 29, at 436.
107. Note, Protecting First Amendment Rights of Defendants by Limiting Plain-
tiffs' Access to the Courts: Procedural Approaches to Noerr and Sullivan, 62 Minn.
L. Rev. 681, 691 n.44 (1978) (quoting McWilliams. Is muckraking coming back?,
Colum. Journalism Rev., Fall 1970, at 8, at 15).
108. [More], Aug. 1974, at 17, col. 2 (Editor's Note) [hereinafter cited as Editor's
Note]. [More] reported that the New York Times had refused to print certain mate-
rial obtained from an investigative reporter. Hume, The Mayor. The Times, and The
Lawyers, [More], Aug. 1974, at 1, col. 1. [More] censored that same material in its
account. Editor's Note, supra. See generally Anderson, supra note 29. at 430-32.
109. Editor's Note, supra note 108, at 17, col. 2. Attorneys for both [Morel and
the New York Times had advised the publishers that the material was not libelous,
but that a lawsuit would probably be initiated. Id.; Hume. supra note 108, at 17.
col. 1.
110. Editor's Note, supra note 108, at 17, col. 2. The expense of obtaining sum-
mary judgment in a defamation case has been cited as one reason for the bankruptcy
of a major publication, Look magazine. Hume, supra note 108, at 1. cols. 1-2. The
fear of litigation is particularly threatening to small publications which are less able to
absorb the necessary' costs. Kovner, supra note 29, at 368. Oakes. supra note 76, at
1980]
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Libel litigation may create non-economic disincentives to pub-
lishers as well. Following the initiation of a lawsuit against him, 1"' a
freelance journalist was unable to circulate, through his syndicate, an
article which, without comment, quoted the plaintiff of the pending
action. 112 The syndicate's apparent fear of repercussions resulted in
curtailment of the writer's first amendment rights and chilled the
speech of both author and publisher. 1 13
Additionally, it has been noted that "[t]he press has virtually no
economic incentive to publish anything that might lead to a libel
suit."114 Daily newspapers, for example, may compete for circula-
tion through the use of comics, color photographs, and contests rather
than risk the defamation actions which could result from more aggres-
sive and informative journalism. 115 These publishers clearly steer
wide of the unlawftl zone.
Fear of litigation results in self-censorship."16 This fear is mnag-
nified when summary judgment, a device for prompt disposition of
unfounded claims, is not readily available. 117 The high standard of
proof imposed upon public figure defamation plaintiffs resulted from
the national commitment to free debate in areas of public concern.
Casting doubt on the use of summary judgment indicates serious dis-
cord with that commitment.
CONCLUSION
The subjective inquiry in public figure defamation was intended to
shield publishers, allowing breathing space, for free expression. It
should not now be used as a sword against them, requiring defense of
unwarranted lawsuits. The high standard of actual malice creates a
likelihood that summary judgment often will be appropriate. To this
extent, summary judgment has been, and should continue to be, the
rule. Courts should not follow the suggestion of footnote nine; to do
so would alter normal summary judgment procedure and ignore first
amendment concerns.
Andrea B. Feller
713. Among these, there is a greater incentive to forego publication of material which
could result in a libel suit. Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 972 (D.C.
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967).
111. Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078
(1980).
112. See Hentoff, supra note 8, at 20, col. 2. Hentoff notes that the writer has had
to bear the full expense as the publisher was granted summary judgment by the
lower court. Id. at 21, col. 3; see Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
113. See Hentoff, supra note 8, at 20, col. 2.
114. Anderson, supra note 29, at 433.
115. Id.
116. See notes 101-03 supra and accompanying text.
117. See Anderson, supra note 29, at 451-52.
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